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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In this appeal, Wade Peterson challenges the district court's denial of his motion 
seeking reimbursement for past payments of restitution pursuant to I.C. § 37-2732(k), 
as well other court fees, costs, and criminal fines, based upon the district court's 
erroneous reliance on State v. Hooper1 to determine that the court lacked jurisdiction to 
do so. Specifically, Mr. Peterson has asserted that the decision in Hooper is inapposite 
to the facts of this case because there was no evidence presented that the funds paid 
by Mr. Peterson went to agencies over which the district court lacked personal 
jurisdiction, or that the funds paid by Mr. Peterson were ever disbursed by the clerk of 
the district court at all. 
The State takes no issue with the substantive claims raised by Mr. Peterson on 
appeal. In fact, the State's sole contention is a very limited one: that, because 
Mr. Peterson's motion seeking return of the funds that he had paid on the basis of his 
now vacated conviction was not filed within 42 days of the district court's order 
dismissing his prior conviction, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to take 
action on Mr. Peterson's motion. 
The State's jurisdictional argument is without merit for two reasons. First, 
because the court fees, costs, and restitution were part of his underlying judgment of 
conviction and sentence - which has since been vacated - his motion for return of 
these funds was essentially in the nature of a motion challenging an illegal sentence, 
1 State v. Hooper, 150 Idaho 497 (2010). 
1 
which may be raised at any time. Second, with regard to restitution, Idaho appellate 
cases have already recognized that the jurisdictional limitations set forth in State v. 
JakoskF do not apply to criminal restitution orders. Moreover, both the provisions of 
!.R.C.P. 60(b) and case law regarding general requests for equitable relief recognize 
that a court's jurisdiction may be extended through such a request. Given that the 
substance of Mr. Peterson's motion for reimbursement invokes both types of claims, the 
district court had the subject matter jurisdiction to entertain this motion on its merits. 
Additionally, issues such as the statute of limitations and the time for filing 
pleadings are treated as defenses in civil cases, not as jurisdictional limitations on the 
court's power to entertain the merits of the actions. To the extent that the State's 
argument in this appeal constitutes an argument regarding the statute of limitations for a 
request for equitable relief from the prior enforcement of the restitution order in 
Mr. Peterson's underlying criminal case, this claim is not properly before this Court. 
Because restitution orders are treated as civil matters for purposes of the timeliness of 
filings, and because the State waived any defense of the statute of limitations by not 
raising an objection as to the timeliness of the filing before the district court, the State 
may not now assert a statute of limitations defense as to Mr. Peterson's request for 
restitution reimbursement for the first time on appeal. 
Accordingly, because the State's sole contentions on appeal regarding the 
timeliness of Mr. Peterson's request for reimbursement do not demonstrate a lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, Mr. Peterson asks that this Court reverse the district court's 
2 State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352 (2003). 
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order denying his request for reimbursement and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Peterson's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err in finding that it lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Peterson's motion 
seeking reimbursement of funds paid as a result of his conviction that was vacated by 
the Idaho Supreme Court, and thereafter denying Mr. Peterson's motion for 
reimbursement? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Finding That It Lacked Jurisdiction Over Mr. Peterson's 
Motion Seeking Reimbursement Of Funds Paid As A Result Of His Conviction That Was 
Vacated By The Idaho Supreme Court, And Thereafter Denying Mr. Peterson's Motion 
For Reimbursement 
A. Introduction 
The State's sole contention in this appeal is that the district court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction to entertain the merits of Mr. Peterson's motion for reimbursement for 
money paid to the court as a result of his now vacated conviction, because this motion 
was not filed within 42 days of the district court's order dismissing this conviction. 
However, the State's argument cannot be sustained by the case law for two reasons. 
First, regarding funds Mr. Peterson paid towards court fines, fees and costs, these 
penalties were ordered as part and parcel of Mr. Peterson's judgment of conviction and 
sentence, which was vacated by the district court. Accordingly, Mr. Peterson asserts 
that his motion was akin to a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35), and that he may raise such a motion at any 
time. 
Second, to the extent that Mr. Peterson paid a portion of the money for which he 
seeks reimbursement towards the restitution order in this case, this Court has already 
held that the jurisdictional limitations set forth in State v. Jakoski do not apply to criminal 
restitution matters. Moreover, restitution matters in criminal cases are treated as civil 
actions by the reviewing courts. A statute of limitations defense in civil matters is not a 
jurisdictional limitation, and cannot be invoked on appeal when not raised before the 
trial court. The State did not raise any claim or defense that Mr. Peterson's request was 
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untimely before the district court, and therefore cannot invoke such a claim on appeal. 
Accordingly, Mr. Peterson asks that this Court reverse the district court's order denying 
his motion seeking reimbursement, and remand this case for further proceedings. 
B. The District Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction To Entertain The Merits Of 
Mr. Peterson's Motion Seeking Reimbursement Of Funds He Had Paid To The 
Clerk Of The District Court Based Upon His Now Vacated Conviction 
The State, in response to Mr. Peterson's claims on appeal, raises no argument 
regarding the substantive merits of these issues. Rather, the State's sole argument is 
a narrow one - that Mr. Peterson's motion was untimely, and therefore the district court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the merits of this motion.3 Mr. Peterson 
asserts that the State's challenge on appeal is without merit. 
1. Because The Criminal Fines, And Related Court Fees And Costs, Were 
Part Of Mr. Peterson's Now Vacated Conviction For Possession Of A 
Controlled Substance, His Motion Seeking Reimbursement For The 
Amounts Paid As Part Of His Criminal Sentence Should Be Treated By 
This Court Under The Provisions Of Rule 35 Governing Motions To 
Correct An Illegal Sentence, Which May Be Raised At Any Time 
Because the underlying criminal fine, along with the fees and costs, that were 
awarded by the district court were part of Mr. Peterson's underlying criminal sentence -
that has since been vacated - Mr. Peterson asserts that his motion for reimbursement 
for money paid towards these criminal penalties be treated for purposes of the 
3 Because the underlying ruling tendered by the district court in this case dealt with the 
perceived lack of personal jurisdiction over the necessary parties, and not to the 
separate consideration of whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to 
entertain Mr. Peterson's motion, the State raises this issue for the first time on appeal. 
However, issues regarding the subject matter jurisdiction are fundamental and, as such, 
may be raised for this first time on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 
372, 374 (Ct. App. 2008). 
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timeliness of his filing as a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Just as any other 
portion of his sentence was unlawful upon the vacation of his conviction, so too were 
these financial penalties. 
Criminal fines, forfeitures, and costs are a component of a defendant's underlying 
sentence. See, e.g., I.C. § 19-4705 (dealing with the payment and apportionment of 
fines, forfeitures, and costs ordered as a part of a criminal judgment); State v. Korsen, 
141 Idaho 445, 447-450 (2005) (discussing generally court fines as part of the 
punishment imposed within a criminal sentence); State v. Alexander, 138 Idaho 18, 26 
(Ct. App. 2002). 
The State, in this appeal, relies primarily on the case of State v. Jakoski for its 
assertion that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the merits 
of Mr. Peterson's motion for reimbursement, and argues that he was required to file this 
motion within 42 days of the district court's order dismissing his underlying criminal 
conviction. See State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352 (2003); Respondent's Brief, pp.3-5. 
However, a motion pursuant to Rule 35 alleging an illegal sentence may be raised at 
any time. See, e.g., State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 839-841 (2011). And the Court in 
Jakoski expressly recognized that a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to 
Rule 35 is among those grounds under the law which extends a criminal court's 
jurisdiction beyond the time that an underlying judgment becomes final. Jakoski, 139 
Idaho at 355 n.5. In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that the district 
court's jurisdiction over a Rule 35 motion alleging an illegal sentence may extend in 
some circumstances to beyond the time a defendant has served his or her entire 
sentence. Lute, 150 Idaho at 838-841. 
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Because Mr. Peterson's challenge to the retention of funds paid as a result of 
criminal fines and court costs - awarded incident to his vacated criminal conviction -
was at its core a challenge to the lawfulness of this portion of his sentence, it should be 
treated by this Court as a challenge to the lawfulness of his sentence under Rule 35. 
As a challenge to the lawfulness of a sentence may be raised at any time, 
Mr. Peterson's motion seeking reimbursement for these funds was timely. 
2. The Restitution Ordered By The District Court As A Result Of 
Mr. Peterson's Now Vacated Conviction Is Not Governed By The 
Jurisdictional Limitations Set Forth In Jakoski, And The State Failed To 
Raise A Defense Of The Statute Of Limitations At Trial; Therefore The 
State May Not Now Assert A Statute Of Limitations Defense As To His 
Request For Reimbursement Of Payments Made Towards Restitution For 
The First Time On Appeal 
The State's reliance on the time limitations set forth in Jakoski is further 
misplaced with regard to reimbursement of monies paid towards the restitution order in 
this case, as Idaho case law has already determined that these limitations expressly do 
not apply in the context of a criminal restitution order. state v. Jensen, 149 Idaho 758, 
760-763 (Ct. App. 2010). In fact, although this case is not acknowledged by the State in 
its briefing, the Jensen Court considered and rejected the very same argument by the 
State to a collateral challenge to a restitution order that is now being advanced on 
appeal. Id. at 762. The rules governing the time requirements for seeking relief from 
judgments and other equitable relief in civil proceedings would instead govern in this 
case. And under those rules, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
Mr. Peterson's request for reimbursement. Moreover, to the extent that the State is 
advancing a statute of limitations defense on appeal, such a claim was waived due to 
the failure of the State to raise such a claim before the district court. 
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Restitution has been held to be, "in essence, a civil proceeding distinct from the 
criminal case." State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830,834 (Ct. App. 2010). In light of this, 
the Court of Appeals has already held that the jurisdictional time limits articulated in 
Jakoski do not apply in the context of proceedings relating to restitution entered in 
conjunction with a criminal conviction. Jensen, 149 Idaho at 760-763. In fact, the State 
appears to have made the same argument in Jensen that it is now advancing in this 
appeal- and which was rejected by the Jensen Court. Jensen, 149 Idaho at 762. The 
rationale for rejecting the argument now re-pressed by the State on appeal in this case 
was set forth as follows: 
Restitution is a statutorily granted power to the criminal trial court, not 
constitutional. Restitution is in the nature of a civil remedy as opposed to 
a criminal sentence and, indeed, the statute references the applicability of 
the rules of civil procedure. The time frames set out in I.C. § 19-5304(6) 
and (10), regarding when a court may entertain a request for relief, are 
procedural in nature. While the procedure is apparently designed to 
secure finality so that the order of restitution may become a civil judgment, 
that purpose does not change their nature from defining when the court 
may act to, instead terminating the court's subject matter jurisdiction to 
act. Orders of a criminal trial court relating to restitution do not 
invade the authority over a criminal defendant that is constitutionally 
or statutorily conferred upon the executive branch. The 42-day time 
limit in I.C. § 19-5304(10), while corresponding to the number of days 
granted to file an appeal, does not, itself, affect an appellate court's 
assumption of jurisdiction. 
Jensen, 149 Idaho at 762. 
Moreover, to the extent that the holding in State v. Hartwig dealt with the 
jurisdictional limitations on a motion to reconsider a judgment under the civil rules in a 
context not related to restitution, the pertinent civil rules governing motions for 
reconsideration would provide for jurisdiction for the district court to entertain the merits 
of, and grant relief pursuant to, Mr. Peterson's motion for reimbursement in this case. 
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See State v. Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326, 329 (2011). The holding in Jakoski regarding the 
absence of subject matter jurisdiction upon expiration of the time to appeal is limited to 
those cases where there is no statute or court rule that would otherwise extend the 
court's jurisdiction. Jakoski, 139 Idaho at 355. Among those bases expressly 
recognized by the Jakoski Court for extending the trial court's jurisdiction is I.R.C.P. 
60(b). Id. at 355 n.5. 
Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court in Hartwig - the only other case relied upon 
by the State in its substantive argument on appeal - made clear that the provisions of 
I.R.C.P. 60(b) operate to extend the trial court's jurisdiction even under Jakoski. 
Hartwig, 150 Idaho at 329. While the Hartwig Court did not find jurisdiction to have 
been extended under I.R.C.P. 60(b), it was not because this rule does not provide a 
basis to extend a court's jurisdiction. Rather, it was because the State had "not 
identified a basis under Rule 60(b) upon which the district court could have granted 
relief." Id. Given this, the Court analyzed the underlying motion for reconsideration filed 
by the State under the rubric of I.R.C.P. 59(e). Id. Unlike the provisions of I.R.C.P. 
60(b), the time limits proscribed by I.R.C.P. 59(e) are expressly mandatory, as the rule 
provides that such motion, "shall be served not later than fourteen (14) days after entry 
of the judgment." I.R.C.P. 59(e). 
The Court of Appeals in Jensen implicitly recognized that collateral challenges to 
a restitution order are cognizable under I.R.C.P. 60(b). See Jensen, 149 Idaho at 761-
762. Under I.R.C.P. 60(b), a motion to relieve a party from a formal judgment may be 
made if, inter alia, the underlying judgment is void or if the prior judgment upon which 
the order was based was "reversed or otherwise vacated." See I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4), (5). If 
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a motion is made under either of these provisions, the general requirement that the 
motion be filed within six months of the underlying order does not apply. LR.C.P. 60(b). 
In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court in Stuart v. State pointed out that such a motion may 
be made, "even after entry of a final judgment." Stuart v. State, 128 Idaho 436, 437 
(1996). Mr. Peterson asserts that his motion seeking reimbursement for the sums he 
paid out for restitution as a result of his underlying criminal conviction - which was 
subsequently vacated on appeal - falls within the scope of both LR.C.P. 60(b)(4) and 
(5).4 See Stuart, 128 Idaho at 437 (LR.C.P. 60(b)(5) applies in situations where a prior 
judgment is reversed and the order being challenged was based on that prior 
judgment). Accordingly, by the operation of this rule, the court's jurisdiction to entertain 
the merits of his motion was extended and Jakoski is inapplicable. 
Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has long recognized the inherent authority 
of a trial court to entertain a motion for equitable relief from a judgment. See, e.g., 
Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 537 (1992); Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 
333-334 (1980). These cases further note that there is no specific time limitation on the 
ability to seek such equitable relief. Harper, 122 Idaho at 537; Compton, 101 Idaho at 
334. That is because "the power of the courts to entertain such an action is 'inherent, 
4 Mr. Peterson's motion for reimbursement did not invoke a particular statute or court 
rule in support of this motion. (R., pp.15-16.) However, this Court has recognized that, 
with regard to motions, it is the substance of the relief sought, and not the label attached 
to the motion, that controls the analysis. See, e.g., Howard v. FMC Corp., 98 Idaho 
465, 471 (1977) (the title of a legal document is not controlling as to its legal effect); 
Anderson v. Springer, 78 Idaho 17, 22 (1956) (the character of a pleading is determined 
by its contents and not by the name by which it is called); Ade v. Batten, 126 Idaho 114, 
116 n.1 (Ct. App. 1994). Given the nature of Mr. Peterson's request for relief in this 
case, he asserts that the substance of his claim for relief invokes both the provisions of 
I.R.C.P. 60(b) and principles of equity. 
11 
not statutory, and is not subject to the time limitations imposed by the statute.'" 
Compton, 101 Idaho at 334 (quoting Gregory v. Hancock, 81 Idaho 221,227 (1959)). 
This inherent power on the part of the trial court is further codified under I.R.C.P. 
60(b) itself, which provides in pertinent part that this rule, "does not limit the power of 
the court to: (i) entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order 
or proceedings." See Compton, 101 Idaho at 333-334; I.R.C.P. 60(b). 
An order of restitution is contingent upon a valid conviction. I.C. § 19-5304(2); 
State v. Korsen, 141 Idaho 445, 450 (2005). When a conviction is vacated, the 
associated restitution order should also be vacated. Cf. State v. Shook, 144 Idaho 858, 
861 (Ct. App. 2007). A trial court has jurisdiction as part of its inherent power to correct 
the effects of its own wrongdoing and to restore the defendant to the status quo ante-to 
entertain a motion for the return of restitution payments. Cooper v. Gordon, 389 So.2d 
318 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). This equitable authority would extend to Mr. Peterson's 
payments towards the restitution order, as well as his payments that were paid towards 
the criminal fine and court costs flowing from his now vacated conviction. Accordingly, 
because Idaho courts have inherent authority to entertain an action seeking equitable 
relief from a judgment, and Mr. Peterson was invoking the court's equitable power to 
grant relief, this authority extended the court's jurisdiction to entertain the merits of 
Mr. Peterson's motion. See Harper, 122 Idaho 537; Compton, 101 Idaho at 334. 
The case law on such requests for equitable relief recognizes that such claims 
must be raised within a "reasonable time" of the judgment at issue. Harper, 122 Idaho 
at 537; Compton, 101 Idaho at 334. But the Court in Compton further recognized that a 
challenge to the reasonableness of the timing of the filing will not be evaluated by the 
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appellate court in the absence of an express argument by the opposing party as to why 
the request for equitable relief was not filed in a reasonable time. Compton, 101 Idaho 
at 334. The State in this appeal relies solely on the time limits set forth in Jakoski to 
support its argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction. As in Compton, the State 
has not argued to this court that Mr. Peterson's filing was otherwise not within a 
reasonable time frame from the court's order dismissing his underlying criminal charges. 
Accordingly, such a challenge is not before this Court. 
Finally, to the extent that the State may be raising a statute of limitations defense 
against Mr. Peterson's claim for reimbursement, the State has waived such a challenge 
on appeal due to not having raised this defense before the district court. As was 
previously noted, restitution proceedings in a criminal case have been deemed to be "a 
civil proceeding distinct from the criminal case." Mosqueda, 150 Idaho at 834. "Under 
the civil rules, compliance with the governing statute of limitations is not a requirement 
for subject matter jurisdiction; rather, the time bar of the statute of limitations is an 
affirmative defense that may be waived if it is not pleaded by the defendant." See, e.g., 
Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 110 (2000); Anderson v. State, 133 Idaho 788, 792 (Ct. 
App. 1999). Accordingly, appellate courts in Idaho will deem such a defense to be 
waived, and will not consider the merits of such a claim, where it is raised for the first 
time on appeal. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Peterson respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying his motion for reimbursement, and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 15th day of February, 2012. 
RAH E. TOMPKINS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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